441619
From: akira, [DNS_Address]
Subject: Harris and Walz Can Remake US Foreign Policy
URL: https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2024/08/harris-and-walz-can-remake-us-foreign-policy/
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By Mark Hannah and Rachel Rizzo This article appeared in Foreign Policy on August 7, 2024 Harris and Walz Can Remake US Foreign Policy "The VP pick may help Harris reinvest in diplomacy—and abandon America’s reflex for military interventionism. US President Joe Biden has pitched himself as a transitional figure—someone who could right the ship after former President Donald Trump’s mercurial tenure while a new generation of Democrats readied for the future. On matters of foreign policy, it often felt as though Biden had one foot in the past and another in the present. His worldview is shaped by the Cold War and steeped in conventional notions of American indispensability. Yet his foreign-policy legacy will also include ending the United States’ longest war and engaging in creative diplomacy, including the kind that led to the release of American prisoners from Russia last week. Now that she is atop the presidential ticket, Vice President Kamala Harris must define her own approach to the world. The choice of Minnesota Gov. Tim Walz as her running mate might help. As a Midwestern leader attuned to the preferences of heartland voters, who has spent more years in the Army National Guard than in professional politics, there is little indication Walz is invested in the stale foreign-policy ideas Washington continues to feed itself. Biden’s foreign-policy slogan, “America is back,” was a double-edged sword. For some voters, it heralded a welcome return to pre-Trump normalcy. For others, it signaled an uncritical reversion to a status quo that is neither politically popular nor strategically wise. Harris offered a glimpse at a more forward-looking vision during her presidential campaign launch last month. Her rallying cry of “We are not going back” is ostensibly about Trump-era policies, but it could equally apply to the ossified thinking of much of America’s national security leadership. If polls are any indication, many of those cheering Harris are disinclined to return to an era when notions of American exceptionalism justified ill-fated regime-change wars, when the United States saw itself as democracy’s lone arsenal and “indispensable” defender, when criticism of Israel was tantamount to heresy, and when revamping the U.S.-Europe relationship elicited accusations of abandoning allies. Harris might yet develop a more pragmatic and progressive foreign policy, pursuing a strategy of “what can be, unburdened by what has been.” This line—which Harris has repeated often—has become a sort of mantra for her. When applied to foreign policy, it could inform a pragmatic, forward- looking realism that’s all too rare in Washington. " … Read more of Mark’s and Rachel’s article in Foreign Policy Written by Mark Hannah Mark is a senior fellow with the Independent America project at the Institute for Global Affairs and host of the podcast, None Of The Above. Institute for Global Affairs, Eurasia Group. Written by Rachel Rizzo Rachel Rizzo is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. This post is part of Independent America, a research project led out by IGA senior fellow Mark Hannah, which seeks to explore how US foreign policy could better be tailored to new global realities and to the preferences of American voters. POLITICS & GOVERNMENT | |
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441620
From: AKIRA, [DNS_Address]
Subject: BATTLEGROUNDS: How Trump/Harris Voters See America’s Role in the world
URL: 🆕 BATTLEGROUNDS: How Trump and Harris Voters See America’s 🇺🇸 Role in the World 🌎
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Institute for Global Affairs - Sep 24 excerpt: "We asked Americans in six swing states and across the United States their perspectives on critical foreign policy issues. NEW REPORT: Battlegrounds Eloise Cassier, Lucas Robinson, Mark Hannah, Ransom Miller | Sep 23, 2024 In a democracy, the voice of the people (“vox populi”) is supposed to be the voice of God (“vox dei”). In the United States, leaders are supposed to rely on the consent of the governed. Yet, within the realm of foreign policy, the popular will is not being reflected in the views of elected leaders and experts. Although public opinion can be capricious and grand strategies must be developed to withstand changing sentiments, a fundamental premise of this project is that policymakers must be sensitive and responsive to the wishes of their constituents. This project seeks to (1) illustrate the chasm which exists between the interests and concerns of foreign policy elites and those of ordinary citizens, and (2) identify the reasons why Americans are increasingly disenfranchised from foreign policy decisions being made in Washington. The Institute for Global Affairs pursues industry-leading research on geopolitics and global affairs, creates relevant, objective, fact-based content, tools, and programming and partners with people and organizations around the world to drive awareness, increase understanding, and support action. This annual survey is part of the Independent America project, which seeks to explore how US foreign policy could better be tailored to new global realities and to the preferences of American voters. View our reports from 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 to see more work on this topic. BATTLEGROUNDS How Trump and Harris Voters See America’s Role in the World By Mark Hannah, Lucas Robinson, Eloise Cassier, & Ransom Miller September 2024 View Report as PDF Executive Summary | Introduction | Who Took our Survey? Specific Findings | Methodology & Acknowledgements In The News Executive Summary This year the Institute for Global Affairs (IGA) asked 1,835 Americans their perspectives on key foreign policy issues. Our findings reveal important differences across parties, candidate preferences, and between the national population and residents of hotly contested battleground states. In addition to a nationally representative sample, we included focused samples of three Rust Belt states (Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Michigan) and three Sun Belt states (Georgia, Arizona, and Nevada), with potential consequences for this year’s presidential election. Harris leads on critical foreign policy issues nationally, but Trump leads in key swing states. Nationally, Kamala Harris is seen as the candidate more likely to pursue a foreign policy which “benefits people like you,” improve America’s international reputation, be a strong leader who advances America’s interests internationally, and less likely to send US troops to an unnecessary war. In swing states, however, Donald Trump has the edge on each of these. Where Trump is perceived more favorably than Harris nationally — more likely to reform immigration, end the Gaza and Ukraine wars, and respond effectively to a Chinese attack on Taiwan — he has an even greater margin of favorability in swing states. People in Rust Belt states care more about the rise of China and less about climate change than Americans nationwide. Those in Sun Belt states care more than the nationwide population about immigration. These views could bode well for Trump’s candidacy. Supporters of Kamala Harris and Donald Trump differ on key foreign policy issues. Trump supporters appear less hawkish on China than the average Republican, and Harris supporters appear more hawkish on China than the average Democrat. For example, more Republicans than Democrats think the West should prepare for a new Cold War between the US and China (68% vs. 52%), but the margin shrinks when comparing Trump supporters to Harris supporters (66% vs. 54%). Harris supporters are 18% more likely than Trump supporters (and 7% more likely than Democrats) to think the US should militarily defend Taiwan. People who intend to vote for a different candidate are least likely to think it should. A majority (58%) of Harris supporters think the US should maintain or increase the number of overseas troops while a majority (58%) of Trump supporters think the US should decrease the number. People who intend to vote for a different candidate are aligned with Trump supporters — 56% prefer a troop decrease. A majority of Harris supporters are “Wilsonian,” advocating for a rules-based order focused on democracy, liberal economics, and human rights (59%). A plurality of Trump supporters are “Jacksonian,” averse to deep global engagement but supporting a strong military to deter enemies (41%). A plurality of people who plan to vote for candidate besides these two are “Jeffersonian,” wanting to strengthen democracy at home and promote it abroad not by force but by example (48%). Republicans and Independents are less hawkish on European security than Democrats. Democrats and Independents are less hawkish on the Gaza war and China than Republicans. US goals in Ukraine which would de-escalate the war are prioritized more than twice as often as those which would perpetuate or intensify it. Republicans and Independents are about 20% more likely than Democrats to prioritize avoiding a wider war. If Finland, a new NATO ally, were invaded by Russia, after being reminded of NATO’s obligation for collective defense, 76% of Democrats — but only 55% of Republicans and 59% of Independents — would support a US military operation to expel Russian forces. Majorities of Democrats (67%) and Independents (55%) believe the US should either end support for Israel’s war effort or make that support conditional on a ceasefire. Only 8% of Democrats but 42% of Republicans think the US must support Israel unconditionally. Twice as many Democrats as Republicans think the West needs to cooperate with China should dissuade the US from preparing for a new Cold War. Twice as many Republicans as Democrats think China presents a threat to US security, and so the US should prepare for one. Twice as many Democrats think the US should normalize relations with Cuba as should continue to pressure and isolate Cuba (66% vs. 34%), and Republicans are more evenly divided on the issue (45% vs. 55%). Americans have mixed views of the Biden administration’s foreign policy record. The release of American prisoners from Russia and NATO expansion are seen as among President Biden’s most significant foreign policy successes (though addressing climate change is the top choice among Democrats). Republicans and Independents most often point to immigration as one of Biden’s top foreign policy failures. Democrats most often select the US response to the war in Gaza. Thirty percent of respondents cite the withdrawal from Afghanistan as one of Biden’s biggest foreign policy failures. However, 62% of Americans believe the Afghanistan war was primarily a failed mission from the start or should have ended when Osama bin Laden was killed. President Biden’s framing of foreign policy as a global struggle between democracy and autocracy may not resonate with most Americans. Though four times as many Democrats as Republicans cite threats to democracy in foreign countries as a top concern, among a list of 12 foreign policy issues, it is the issue Americans care about the least. Younger and older generations disagree about how US policy should approach Israel’s war in Gaza, a new Cold War with China, and normalizing relations with Cuba. Twice as many adults under 30 as those 65 and older think the US must stop supporting Israel’s war in Gaza (23% vs. 11%). Twice as many adults 65 and older as those under 30 think the US must support Israel’s war unconditionally (26% vs. 13%). Americans 45 and older are much more likely than Americans under 45 to think the US must prepare for a new Cold War with China (68% vs 47%). Two-thirds of adults under 30 think the US should normalize relations with Cuba rather than continue isolating the island nation. A slight majority of Americans 65 and older agree (66% vs. 53%). Back to Table of Contents Introduction In our seventh year of polling Americans about their foreign policy views, we have a confession to make: foreign policy does not frequently register as a priority for American voters. Concerns closer to home loom larger than overseas wars and geopolitical competition. But as Americans get ready to vote for a new president in November, debates about America’s international obligations and actions have taken on new urgency. In short, foreign policy is having a moment. In 2024, the world reckons with the aftermath of a pandemic, a new war in the Middle East, a protracted war in Ukraine, and intensifying geopolitical competition. Early this year, one influential poll revealed an uptick in foreign policy interest. Though the economy remains a top voter issue, about twice as many Americans cited foreign policy as a top priority — and four times as many expressed concern about US involvement overseas — this year as last year.1 This prioritization of foreign policy has held firm. In September, a Pew survey showed foreign policy as the fourth most important issue for voters.2 A Washington Post poll from earlier in the summer ranked the Gaza and Ukraine wars in the top ten important issues.3 The rise of voter interest in foreign policy offers us some hope here at the Institute for Global Affairs, an organization committed to helping people make sense of geopolitics. Conventional wisdom suggests Americans both know and care little about foreign policy. As a result, foreign policy leaders don’t face much political pressure, and so the popular will isn’t always reflected in Washington’s policy prescriptions. This year’s election, however, could be different. Foreign policy positions could shape the stakes of this November’s election. If Harris wins, foreign policy analysts argue she could take a more restrained approach, one which reflects a “humbler” view of US influence in the world.4 Yet Harris hasn’t articulated a concrete plan for ending or de-escalating the war in Ukraine. Donald Trump promised to immediately end the Ukraine war and avoid “World War III.” Yet his less qualified support for Israel’s war and his significant increase of the US defense budget in his first term obscure his commitment to military restraint.5 It remains to be seen how voters’ preferences will be reflected in these policies — and in the outcome of the election. But in a year when foreign policy matters more than usual, our survey offers a glimpse into Americans’ foreign policy preferences. For the first time, our survey (fielded August 15-19) includes focused sampling of voting-age adults in critical battleground states alongside a nationally representative sample. We compare the views of voting age adults in the national population with voting age adults in swing states in the Rust Belt (Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Michigan) and Sun Belt (Georgia, Nevada and Arizona). These two groups of swing states offer both candidates the most likely pathways to victory.6 In our survey, Rust Belt voters — midwestern populations living in America’s industrial heartland — expressed foreign policy preferences which diverged in important ways from Americans as a whole. They were, for example, more concerned about competition with China and trade, but less supportive of US interventionism. Voters in the Sun Belt — an area which has seen rapid business growth and a marked rise in immigration — reported significantly more interest in immigration than the national average. This election will shape a new era in American foreign policy in important ways. In a healthy democracy, international relations conducted on behalf of the public must be subject to public scrutiny and debate. We have seen how global public health crises, international economic collapse, regional war and insecurity, and mass migrations can affect Americans’ daily lives from the Rust Belt to the Sun Belt, and from coastal cities to rural towns. We hope this report helps shed light on the preferences of the American voters who deserve attention from leaders who seek to represent them. We also hope it supports meaningful public discussion of, and education about, the critical foreign policy topics which confront the United States during this election year, and in the years to come. Back to Executive Summary Who Took Our Survey? Back to Executive Summary Specific Findings Perceptions of the Biden Legacy | Critical Issues on the Ballot | Highlights from Key Swing States | How Americans See America’s Role | Issues for the Next President Perceptions of the Biden Legacy Across the aisle, the release of American prisoners from Russia and NATO expansion are seen as among President Biden’s most significant foreign policy successes (though addressing climate change is the top choice among Democrats). Immigration and the Afghanistan withdrawal are seen as among the most significant failures (though the US response to the Gaza war is the top choice among Democrats). The finding that the release of American prisoners from Russia is a significant foreign policy success may be a result of the recent prisoner swap, which included the release of Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich, when our survey was fielded.7 Gershkovich was arrested in March 2023 on charges of espionage and sentenced to 16 years in prison, and his case attracted substantial media attention.8 More than one third of Democrats identified Biden’s top foreign policy success to be investments in green energy. Provisions for renewable energy and climate change measures were included in the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, a key piece of legislation for the Biden administration.9 Strengthening European alliances was another core piece of President Biden’s foreign policy agenda, which he highlighted in July’s NATO Summit. An IGA survey released in June found most Americans think Europe should be primarily responsible for its own defense.10 Yet though it expands America’s defense obligations in Europe, more than one in four consider the expansion of NATO as one of the president’s most significant successes. Perceptions of foreign policy failures are divided along partisan lines. Biden’s response to immigration is considered the biggest foreign policy failure among Republicans and Independents, closely followed by ending the war in Afghanistan. A plurality of Democrats consider the handling of the Israel- Hamas war in Gaza to be a top foreign policy failure. Republicans and Independents appear more likely to prioritize immigration and security over other issues, while Democrats are more likely to prioritize humanitarian issues and climate change over other issues. In the run-up to the election, Republicans will likely seek to implicate Kamala Harris in President Biden’s perceived foreign policy failures, especially immigration. Harris has drawn on her past as a prosecutor to signal she will be tough on border security (and crime), but she will need to strike a delicate balance — this could appeal to moderate Republicans and Independents, but alienate some progressive Democrats." CONTINUES |
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