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56434
From: akira, [DNS_Address]
Subject: ATACMS: Biden’s decision the right one by any measure, & long overdue
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Bulletin of Atomic Scientists Biden allowing Ukraine to strike into Russia is much ado for little consequence By Mariana Budjeryn | November 18, 2024 "The Biden administration, after a long hesitation, finally allowed Ukraine to use US-supplied ballistic missiles, known as the Army Tactical Missile Systems, or ATACMS, on Russia’s sovereign territory. Britain and France swiftly followed by lifting restrictions on the use of their Storm Shadow/SCALP air-launched cruise missiles against targets in Russia. Biden’s decision is perceived as a major shift in US policy. The reason for the turnaround is likely some combination of the deployment of North Korean troops on the Russian side, the mounting Russian counteroffensive in the Kursk region, and the upcoming second Trump presidency, expected to bring US military aid to Ukraine to a grinding halt. This is not a blank check to Ukraine. The use of ATACMS still comes with restrictions—not all of which have been made public. For now, the permission to use these US weapons systems is reportedly limited to the Kursk operation, where Ukraine is already on Russian sovereign territory and has no operational depth afforded by its occupied territory to strike and thwart Russian offensive efforts. There’s just no other way to defend Ukrainian forces in the occupied swath of the Kursk region but to strike targets on Russian sovereign territory. Ukraine must hold the Russian territory it occupies in Kursk as leverage in a future settlement—whether it’s a truce, a ceasefire, or an armistice. With Trump’s presidency on the horizon and his declared intention to end the war quickly, each belligerent is jostling to put itself in the best position possible before being summoned to the negotiation table. Hedging for Trump’s presidential win might have been a reason for Ukraine’s Kursk operation in the first place. Russia, for its part, has not changed its war aims of destroying Ukraine as a sovereign nation—just ask German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, who spoke with Russian President Vladimir Putin last week. Russia is going to try and maneuver into a position in which negotiations, when they come, could only formalize Ukraine’s surrender. Consequently, the next two months will likely be the bloodiest in this war—for both sides. Politically, it’s a boost of morale for an embattled Ukraine facing increasingly dark times ahead and another salami slice into Russia’s impunity. Militarily, Ukrainians could certainly use these longer-range fires to hamper the Russian counter- operations in the Kursk region and possibly beyond. The ability to use ATACMS on Russian territory will save Ukrainian lives and impose greater costs on Russia. But strategic—even operational—upsides of the ability to use these long-range fires on Russian territory are likely to be more modest than expected. Russia has already moved some high-value targets, such as aircraft, out of the range of these systems deeper into its territory. Many smaller targets, command posts, arms depots, troop concentrations, and more are still within the range of ATACMS, which is up to 300 kilometers in some modifications. The Ukrainian military could also target nodes of critical infrastructure, such as oil refineries, although it is unknown if the US decision allows the use against such targets. But stocks of ATACMSs, Storm Shadows, and SCALPs supplied to Ukraine are limited, and Kyiv will have to ration and prioritize the expenditure of these scarce and expensive munitions. Some fear that Russia might escalate in response to the US decision. Putin has warned that Russia would regard the NATO states’ permission for Ukraine to use their weapons on Russian territory as NATO’s entry into the war. Now that the permission is granted, even if the effects of such use would be limited operationally, political reasons alone might suffice to justify a Russian escalation of the war in Ukraine. But Russia is already in full escalatory mode in Ukraine. Since August, Russia has been pushing hard and advancing rapidly along the Donbas front. On November 17, it began another campaign against Ukraine’s critical infrastructure with a massive air strike. More such attacks will likely follow in the weeks to come aiming to plunge Ukraine into darkness and cold at the onset of winter and coerce the country into peace on Russian terms. With this new spur of escalation, reasons for which are unrelated to and precede Biden’s decision, Russia is already at the limit of its conventional escalation capacity. It is highly doubtful that Russia may resort to “extra” escalation as a specific answer to Biden’s decision, including against a NATO target. Russia’s recent advances in Ukraine, while steady, have also been incredibly costly. The Russian military has performed poorly in this war and is stretched today—otherwise, it would not have engaged North Korean troops in the Kursk operation. For Russia to pick a fight with thirty-some NATO states at this point—or any other point, for that matter—would be highly imprudent, although not inconceivable. Stripped of the hype, both the positive and the negative exigencies of the permission to strike targets in Russia may turn out to be rather less drastic than the preceding debates had suggested. One can’t help but wonder why US and European capitals built up the issue as so monumentally risky and controversial to begin with. Maybe it was because hype is the currency of contemporary politics. But maybe it was because Western leaders and experts have an embarrassingly poor understanding of escalation dynamics in a major conventional war in the nuclear era. Biden’s much-agonized-about decision will not change the course of war. It is not because ATACMS are ineffectual or because Russia is invincible. Rather, it is because no single weapons system or decision has the power to change the course of a war of attrition. Only a shift in the overall balance of human, military, and economic resources might. Ukraine is inherently disadvantaged in this balance vis-à-vis Russia, which makes Ukraine’s continued survival and resistance even more incredible. The United States and Europe have had 1000 days to tip the scales decisively in Ukraine’s favor, but they chose not to. Biden’s decision on ATACMS will help, but like much else in this war, it is too little too late." |
Responses:
[56437] [56438] [56442] [56435] [56436] [56446] [56447]
56437
From: ryan, [DNS_Address]
Subject: Re: ATACMS: Biden’s decision the right one by any measure, & long...
URL: https://www.sfgate.com/news/article/russian-president-putin-signs-a-new-doctrine-that-19927950.php
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Putin lowers the threshold for using his nuclear arsenal after Biden's arms decision for Ukraine By The Associated Press Updated Nov 19, 2024 11:17 a.m. FILE - In this photo released by Russian Defense Ministry Press Service on April 13, 2021, Russian nuclear submarines Prince Vladimir, above, and Yekaterinburg are harbored at a Russian naval base in Gazhiyevo, Kola Peninsula, Russia. (Russian Defense Ministry Press Service via AP, File) President Vladimir Putin on Tuesday formally lowered the threshold for Russia’s use of its nuclear weapons, a move that follows U.S. President Joe Biden’s decision to let Ukraine strike targets inside Russian territory with American-supplied longer-range missiles. The new doctrine allows for a potential nuclear response by Moscow even to a conventional attack on Russia by any nation that is supported by a nuclear power. Russia’s Defense Ministry said Ukraine fired six U.S.-made ATACMS missiles early Tuesday at a military facility in Russia's Bryansk region that borders Ukraine, adding that air defenses shot down five of them and damaged one more. Ukraine's military claimed the strike hit a Russian ammunition depot. While the doctrine envisions a possible nuclear response by Russia to such a conventional strike, it is formulated broadly to avoid a firm commitment to use nuclear weapons and keep Putin's options open. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov emphasized that the Ukrainian strike in Bryansk marked an escalation and urged the U.S. and other Western allies to study the modernized nuclear doctrine. “If the long-range missiles are used from the territory of Ukraine against the Russian territory, it will mean that they are controlled by American military experts and we will view that as a qualitatively new phase of the Western war against Russia and respond accordingly,” Lavrov said on the sidelines of the G20 meeting in Brazil without elaborating. The approval of the document demonstrates Putin’s readiness to tap his nuclear arsenal to force the West to back down as Moscow presses a slow-moving offensive in Ukraine as the war reached its 1,000th day. Asked Tuesday if a Ukrainian attack with longer-range U.S. missiles could potentially trigger a nuclear response, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov answered affirmatively, pointing to the doctrine’s provision that holds the door open for it after a conventional strike that raises critical threats for the "sovereignty and territorial integrity: of Russia and its ally, Belarus. Commenting on whether the updated doctrine was deliberately issued to follow Biden’s decision, Peskov said the document was published “in a timely manner” and that Putin instructed the government to update it earlier this year so that it is “in line with the current situation.” Putin first announced changes in the nuclear doctrine in September, when he chaired a meeting discussing the proposed revisions. He has previously warned the U.S. and other NATO allies that allowing Ukraine to use Western-supplied longer-range weapons to hit Russian territory would mean that Russia and NATO are at war. Washington has permitted Ukraine to use the longer-range weapons on targets inside Russia after declaring that thousands of North Korean troops were deployed in the Russian region of Kursk to fight an incursion by Kyiv's forces. “I’m unfortunately not surprised by the comments the Kremlin has made around the publication of this new, revised document," said U.S. State Department spokesman Matthew Miller, adding that since the war began, Russia has sought to "coerce and intimidate both Ukraine and other countries around the world through irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and behavior." He added that Washington has not seen any reason "to adjust our own nuclear posture, but we will continue to call on Russia to stop bellicose and irresponsible rhetoric.” A U.S. National Security Council official who was not authorized to comment publicly and requested anonymity underscored that the arrival of thousands of North Korea soldiers to take part in combat operations against Ukraine was a major escalation by Moscow that demanded a response. British Prime Minister Keir Starmer denounced the "irresponsible rhetoric coming from Russia, and that is not going to deter our support for Ukraine.” “We’re now on Day 1,000 of a conflict. That’s 1000 days of Russian aggression, 1,000 days of sacrifices in Ukraine," he said at the G-20 summit in Brazil. "We have stood with Ukraine from the start. I’ve been doubling down in my clear message that we need to ensure Ukraine has what is needed for as long as needed to win this war against Putin.” German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock said in Warsaw that her country would not be intimidated by Russia’s new policy, saying her country made the mistake of cowering in the face of Moscow's aggression in the past but would not do so again. In Warsaw, Poland's Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski described the revised Russian nuclear doctrine as a tacit acknowledgement that Moscow’s conventional forces are weaker than NATO. The updated doctrine says an attack against Russia by a nonnuclear power with the “participation or support of a nuclear power” will be seen as their “joint attack on the Russian Federation.” It says any massive aerial attack on Russia could trigger a nuclear response but avoids any firm commitment and mentions the “uncertainty of scale, time and place of possible use of nuclear deterrent” among the key principles of the nuclear deterrence. The document also notes that aggression against Russia by a member of a military bloc or coalition is viewed as "an aggression by the entire bloc," a clear reference to NATO. At the same time, it spells out conditions for using nuclear weapons in greater detail compared with previous versions of the doctrine, noting they could be used in case of a massive air attack involving ballistic and cruise missiles, aircraft, drones and other flying vehicles. The formulation appears to significantly broaden the triggers for possible nuclear weapons use compared with the document's previous version, which stated Russia could tap its atomic arsenal if case of an attack with ballistic missiles. President Alexander Lukashenko, who has ruled Belarus with an iron hand for more than 30 years and has relied on Russian subsidies and support, has allowed Russia to use his country’s territory to send troops into Ukraine and to deploy some of its tactical nuclear weapons. Since Putin sent troops into Ukraine, he and other Russian voices have frequently threatened the West with Russia’s nuclear arsenal to discourage it from ramping up support for Kyiv. Russian hawks called for toughening the doctrine for months, arguing the previous version failed to deter the West from increasing its aid to Ukraine and created the impression that Moscow would not resort to nuclear weapons. —- Aamer Madhani and Matthew Lee in Washington, Eleonore Hughes in Rio de Janeiro and Vanessa Gera in Warsaw, Poland, contributed. |
56438
From: akira, [DNS_Address]
Subject: and Biden didn't anticipate that?(NT)
| (NT) |
Responses:
[56442]
56442
From: ryan, [DNS_Address]
Subject: Re: and Biden didn't anticipate that?
| i dunno...ya think? |
Responses:
None
56435
From: akira, [DNS_Address]
Subject: or... What the f-ck is Biden doing authorizing Ukraine ...
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for another pov Cenk Uygur nov 17 What the fuck is Biden doing authorizing Ukraine to use US missiles inside Russia? Which side of the political spectrum is this on? The right hates it, the left hates it. Only establishment Democrats and Republicans, who are all neocons serving the donor class, like this. |
56436
From: mitra, [DNS_Address]
Subject: Re: or... What the f-ck is Biden doing authorizing Ukraine ...
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Not rocket science. He is increasing Ukraine's territory and bargaining position towards the inevitable. He knows his reluctance to leave the presidency gave the Donbas to Putin and Xi. The war, the treasure, the West is lost. Das vedanye (sp?) since you are east of the Mississippi. |
56446
From: chaskuchar@stcharlesmo, [DNS_Address]
Subject: Re: or... What the f-ck is Biden doing authorizing Ukraine ...
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starfting world war 3. for sure. hope trump can keep us out of it. |
Responses:
[56447]
56447
From: ryan, [DNS_Address]
Subject: Re: or... What the f-ck is Biden doing authorizing Ukraine ...
| dreams die hard...as mitra noted...da svidaniya |
Responses:
None
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