Pakistan Promised China a New Militarized Naval Base, Leaked Documents
Reveal
"Highest level positive assurances" have been privately conveyed to China
MURTAZA HUSSAIN AND RYAN GRIM
SEP 18, 2024
In 1953, the U.S. overthrew the popular Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad
Mosaddegh, orchestrating a coup and making way for a Western-friendly
autocratic regime. We all know how that worked out. Iran has been our
adversary since the 1979 revolution overthrew our shah. We made an enemy
for nothing. An overlooked book published in 2021, called Losing the Long
Game: The False Promise of Regime Change in the Middle East makes the case
that many of our anti-democratic interventions have similarly been lose-losers
for us. On the one hand, they make a mockery of our ostensible democratic
values. But on the other hand, they don’t even work out from the perspective of
realpolitik, ultimately leading to regimes and populations hostile to us and our
interests. (The author of that book, Phil Gordon, is now Kamala Harris’s top
foreign policy adviser. Let’s see how that goes.)
You’ll probably think of the tragedy of Mosaddegh as you read this new story
from Murtaza Hussain and me. It’s one we’re unusually proud of, based on
reams of internal, secret documents that describe Pakistan’s efforts to balance
its relationship with both China and the United States. And it ends with the
United States undermining Pakistan’s elected government in order to usher in a
more pliant regime, only to see China coming out the winner and the country’s
democracy teetering on the brink. (For details on the nearly unbelievable levels
of democratic backsliding, check out Waqas Ahmed’s piece for Drop Site from
Monday.)
Ultimately, this story about Pakistan is more properly understood as one about
the contest between China and the U.S. that pits the rest of the world in the
middle. Chinese officials, we learned, regularly told their Pakistani counterparts
that Beijing doesn’t see the contest as zero sum, that it’s okay to be friendly
with both major powers. The U.S. does not quite see it that way, and Pakistan
knows it. The result is the story below. If you’re at all interested in foreign affairs,
we think you’ll find this one enlightening.
We know this story will get an unusually high percentage of its readers from
various intelligence agencies around the world, as it’s based on documents
even they (probably) don’t have access to. To those new readers, welcome. We
hope you stick around, learn something, and perhaps try something new. For
source protection reasons, we’re not publishing the documents in full.
If you want to see more of this kind of reporting, please help support our
independent, nonprofit newsroom by becoming a subscriber.
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Gwadar port development as of February 13, 2021. Photo: Gallo Images/Orbital
Horizon/Copernicus Sentinel Data 2021 via Getty Images.
In October of 2022, a pivotal year for Pakistan, military chief Qamar Javed
Bajwa finally won what he had long been striving for: an official state trip to the
United States. His mission was explicit; a document prepared for Bajwa ahead
of the visit is titled, “U.S. Re-Engagement with Pakistan: Ideas for Reviving an
Important Relationship.”
Bajwa especially wanted to reassure Washington that the Pakistani military was
looking to the U.S.—not its rivals, China or Russia—as the country sought to
escape the grip of an economic and political crisis. In a meeting with an
assembly of think tankers and policymakers at the residence of the Pakistani
ambassador in D.C., Bajwa, dressed in civilian clothing, expounded on the
military’s favor for the U.S. over China. Bajwa promised that Pakistan would
seek constructive ties with its rival, India, and other powers aligned with the
U.S., emphasizing the Pakistani military’s cultural preference for Washington
over Beijing. He spoke of his personal love for 1990s U.S. sitcoms—”Married
With Children,” he said, was a particular favorite, according to one guest in
attendance. And, to drive the point home, according to several people at the
event, Bajwa added that he did not even like Chinese food.
The army chief had planned his retirement for November 2022, the following
month. But his comments—reflecting Pakistan’s new stridently pro-U.S. posture
—were catching the attention of Chinese officials, according to a collection of
highly confidential internal strategic assessments, reports, and diplomatic
cables produced between 2023 and 2024. Pakistan’s fraught relationship
between two superpowers is laid out in the documents, which were provided to
Drop Site by sources within the Pakistani security establishment and backed up
by interviews with sources with direct knowledge of the government’s internal
affairs.
From New York, Munir Akram, Pakistan’s representative to the United Nations,
began reporting back cables highlighting “sarcastic” comments from his
Chinese counterpart, who openly tweaked Akram about Pakistan’s sudden
swing toward Washington. In private conversations with their Pakistani
counterparts over the past year, as reported by Pakistani diplomats, Chinese
officials have expressed displeasure with Islamabad for “switching camps”—
rather than merely seeking open relations with both countries.
Now, with their U.S. gamble failing to pay off, Pakistani officials have become
increasingly frantic in their efforts to repair relations with China, including, as
the documents reveal, by granting China approval for a military base at the port
of Gwadar—a major and longstanding strategic demand of Beijing—and
authorizing joint military operations inside Pakistan.
Courting the U.S.
2021 was a rocky year for U.S.-Pakistan relations. Gone was President Donald
Trump, who had taken a liking to Prime Minister Imran Khan, a fellow celebrity-
populist who had served as Pakistan’s prime minister since 2018. The incoming
Biden administration conspicuously distanced itself from Khan, despite public
requests from Khan for a call with President Joe Biden.
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And Khan, a vocal critic of U.S. foreign policy, eventually returned the disdain,
especially when it came to the U.S.’s failed war in Afghanistan, which Biden was
finally bringing to a close. Asked by an American reporter in June 2021 if U.S.
drone flights could continue from Pakistan in the event of a Taliban takeover of
Afghanistan—a key component of Biden’s “over the horizon” strategy of power
projection in the region in the event of withdrawal—Khan replied flatly,
“Absolutely not.”
The next February, Khan made a previously scheduled, but fatefully timed, state
visit to Moscow that coincided with President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of
Ukraine. Khan’s insistence on finishing the trip and remaining neutral in the war
enraged Washington.
In a meeting with Pakistan’s ambassador to the U.S. just two weeks later, in
March 2022, a State Department official, Donald Lu, conveyed his country’s
displeasure, bringing up the possibility of a no-confidence vote to oust Khan
from office. “I think if the no-confidence vote against the Prime Minister
succeeds, all will be forgiven in Washington because the Russia visit is being
looked at as a decision by the Prime Minister. Otherwise, I think it will be tough
going ahead,” Lu said in comments later relayed to the military brass in a
classified cable.
The military, which had initially backed Khan’s emergence as prime minister,
had already been irritated by his increasing self-assertion over the country’s
foreign policy—long recognized as their own turf. The sense that his policies
were now sabotaging their own relations with the U.S. sent them into action.
As the military set the stage for a no-confidence vote to depose Khan, Bajwa
signaled a new direction. Days before Khan’s ouster, the army chief appeared in
Islamabad at a security conference for a televised speech. “The best
equipment we have is the American equipment. We still have deep cooperation
with the U.S. and our Western friends,” Bajwa said to a crowd of journalists and
security officials, in a rebuke to Khan’s own commentary on the bilateral
relationship. “Months back the U.S. Air Force was here for a routine exercise
with our air force.”
In March, Bajwa had personally met with China’s defense minister, who came to
Pakistan to affirm the Chinese military’s ongoing partnership with Pakistan.
Despite that cooperation, Bajwa made painfully clear at the April national
security conference, Pakistan would prefer U.S. weapons.
“China of course is a very important neighbor and has helped us in many ways,”
Bajwa said, before adding, “Our military cooperation with China is growing
because we are denied equipment from the West. Many of the deals which
were concluded have been cancelled. So what do we do?” He cited an example
of Turkish defensive helicopters that Pakistan had attempted to buy, but which
had American-made engines. “It’s a very good machine,” he said, but the U.S.
blocked the deal. “So what do we do? Either we wait or go somewhere else;
either go to Russia or go to China. We prefer to maintain a balance.”
Though a classified internal Pakistani intelligence assessment judges China to
be a more “natural strategic ally” than the U.S., with whom Pakistan is deemed
to share limited interests, the Pakistani military has prized its close relationship
with the U.S. since the Cold War era. The U.S. and other Western countries are
major destinations for investments (including proceeds from financial
corruption), education, and family residency for Pakistani elites, including
members of the security establishment. Pakistani elites store much of their
wealth in the United Kingdom and the United States, both of which have shown
a willingness to confiscate such holdings in the event that international
relations sour, as Russian oligarchs conspicuously learned. Separate from any
cold assessment of the national interest, these personal ties have long been
seen as a major factor influencing Pakistan’s foreign policy approach.
When it came to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Bajwa put public space between
himself and Khan. Khan had recently thundered at a major rally, “Why would we
condemn Russia? Are we your slaves that we would do whatever you say?”
Bajwa called Vladimir Putin’s aggression “very unfortunate.”
“Despite legitimate security concerns of Russia, its aggression against a
smaller country cannot be condoned. Pakistan has consistently called for an
immediate ceasefire and cessation of hostilities,” he said.
Days later, the no-confidence vote went through, with several of Khan’s party
members switching sides under pressure from the military. The deposal of
Khan, while sending Pakistan into a political tailspin that continues to this day,
marked a turning point in the military’s private push to reset its ties with
Washington.
Bajwa’s pivot to the U.S. initially seemed to pay off. In September 2022, with
Khan out, the U.S. approved a sale of spare parts for F-16 fighter jets to
Pakistan worth almost half a billion dollars. A quid pro quo would also see
Pakistan provide munitions for the war effort in Ukraine in exchange for U.S.
support for an International Monetary Fund bailout to aid Pakistan’s ailing
economy.
And a month after the F-16 agreement, Bajwa found himself in Washington,
where he met with top Biden officials, including Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin
and National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan.
In conversations with U.S. officials around that time, Bajwa agreed to a
longstanding U.S. demand to curtail Pakistan’s ballistic missile program in order
to alleviate Washington’s concerns about the possibility that Pakistani long-
range missiles could one day threaten Israel. This concession was previously
reported by Pakistani journalists and later confirmed by sources to Drop Site
News.
Since taking over from Bajwa in November 2022, Asim Munir has accelerated
attempts at rebuilding ties with the U.S. while engaging in a violent crackdown
on supporters of Imran Khan and his party the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, or PTI.
This crackdown has seen the PTI itself banned, Khan and his wife imprisoned,
the flagrant rigging of a national election, and ongoing violent attacks targeting
reporters, civil society activists, and other perceived enemies of the military in
Pakistan and abroad. (The crackdown also included the banning of Drop Site
News.)
Amid this turmoil, Pakistan’s military establishment has also been torn by
internal discontent and power struggles. This August, Pakistan’s former spy
chief Faiz Hameed was arrested by the military on charges of abusing his
office. The detention of Hameed, an individual seen as close to Khan,
represented an exceedingly rare arrest of a senior member of the security
establishment on corruption charges.
Hameed was the head of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence during a
particularly fraught period of its relationship with the U.S., overlapping with the
chaotic collapse of the U.S.-backed government in Afghanistan. Hameed
himself was pictured visiting Kabul during the Taliban takeover, a spectacle
widely interpreted as rubbing salt in the wound of an American defeat. He is
now facing military court martial on accusations of graft and misuse of
authority.
Pakistani Chief of the Army Staff General Qamar Bajwa and General Joseph
Dunford (R), US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on July 22, 2019. Photo
by SAUL LOEB / AFP via Getty Images.
Private Assurances to Beijing
The military’s growing indulgence of the U.S. quickly put Pakistan in a difficult
situation with Beijing, whose own relationship with Washington was becoming
more hostile. In August 2022, former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi took a
provocative trip to Taiwan. As a close ally, China urged Pakistan to offer a full-
throated condemnation. Wary of offending the U.S. at a critical moment, even at
the expense of harming their ties with the Chinese, Pakistan demurred, offering
only a mild public comment on the matter.
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In recent years, Pakistan had also made moves directly at odds with Chinese
strategic interests in the region. On August 5, 2019, Indian Prime Minister
Narendra Modi officially removed Kashmir’s special status. It was not just a
provocation to Pakistan but also to China, as it called into question China’s
territorial claim to India’s disputed Ladakh region, where Chinese and Indian
troops would engage in deadly clashes the following year.
In February 2021, Bajwa initiated a ceasefire along the Kashmir “Line of
Control,” a move that greatly pleased U.S. policymakers as it allowed India to
focus its resources solely on the Chinese front. And in April 2021, Bajwa
allowed the acting U.S. ambassador to visit Gwadar—another diplomatic coup
for the U.S. and an affront to China, which was pushing for the port to be
developed as a strategic asset.
Classified cables provide frank assessments of the moribund state of the once-
robust Pakistan-China alliance. An internal report from 2023 found that ties
between the nations, publicly described as close allies, had experienced
“gradual erosion” and had become “particularly cold” over the previous year.
The tensions can’t be sourced to Pakistan’s U.S. relationship alone, but are also
due to Pakistan’s internal economic and security troubles, as well as China’s
expanding footprint in the country.
Over the past decade, Pakistan has become home to a Chinese-backed
infrastructure building project known as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor,
or CPEC. Yet despite billions in investment, results on the ground have been
underwhelming. While economic growth has been meager, Pakistan’s
government has grown critical of China for saddling it with debt to fund
expensive projects. Now, as the military establishment struggles to raise capital,
it is trying to convince China and other creditors to favorably renegotiate their
loan terms, including by restructuring its debt to alleviate the crippling balance
of payments crisis in the country.
Internal reports emphasize Pakistan’s wish that its relations with the U.S. and
China not be “zero-sum.” “What the Pakistani military prefers is to be able to
maintain a balance between their Chinese and U.S. military relationships,” said
Adam Weinstein, deputy director of the Middle East program at the Quincy
Institute and an analyst on Pakistan. “They believe that if things are balanced,
both sides will have an incentive to keep relations strong.”
Despite this preference, a classified internal Pakistani intelligence assessment
judges China to be a more “natural strategic ally” than the U.S., with whom
Pakistan is deemed to share “limited” strategic interests.
Facing such loss of trust from a key ally, the documents also show that
Pakistan’s military-backed government privately promised Beijing a long-
coveted concession: a Chinese military base in the key port city of Gwadar.
Gwadar is a key node in China’s Belt-and-Road Initiative—the last stop in a land
corridor through Pakistan that would connect China’s economy westward, and
make it less reliant on shipping transit in the South China Sea.
In return, Pakistan asked for a major upgrade in economic and military
assistance from Beijing in order to insulate Islamabad from the fierce reaction
from the U.S. such a deal is expected to provoke.
A 2023 report by the U.S. Institute of Peace found that Beijing had become
Islamabad’s chief supplier of conventional weapons, strategic platforms, and
sophisticated weapons with offensive strike capabilities, as well as a partner in
the joint development of next-generation military aircraft. Military cooperation
between the two states rivals that of China’s higher-profile relationship with
Russia, the report assessed.
Pakistan views the stalling of Gwadar as the major factor harming the
relationship. The talks on Gwadar have been taking place in a forum called the
“Consultation on Strategic Defence and Security Cooperation” or “2+2
dialogue.” A classified document from 2023 confirms that the government of
Pakistan have already given “highest level positive assurances” to their Chinese
counterparts for strategic utilization of Gwadar “in due time.” The document
adds that Pakistan “principally stand[s] by” this commitment. Pakistani officials
have also been internally instructed to recognize the importance of Gwadar in
China’s global military strategy, and to inform their Chinese counterparts that
their need for “joint strategic utilization” of the port will be met.
Internal documents also show that Pakistan has been considering Beijing’s
request for the creation of joint Chinese-Pakistani security companies that can
operate inside Pakistan, in the wake of several deadly attacks on Chinese
engineers in the country.
Two previous rounds of the 2+2 Dialogue ended without any progress on
China’s principal demand of creating a military base at Gwadar, as Pakistani
officials resisted Chinese pressure to accept a demand that would entail loss of
sovereignty over the territory. But in the latest round, hosted by Islamabad in
January of this year, Pakistan, much-weakened by political infighting and
economic stress, acquiesced to the Chinese demand, agreeing to the future
deployment of Chinese military assets at the port.
The January talks stalled on the issue of how to implement the agreement—
kicking the can down the road to the next major meeting.
In June 2024, Munir paid Xi Jinping a call in Beijing. According to a readout,
their discussion had a “focus on building an upgraded version of the China-
Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), so as to promote deeper and more
substantive progress in the high-quality cooperation on CPEC and help boost
Pakistan’s economic and social development.”
In response to inquiries from Drop Site News, the Chinese Embassy in D.C. gave
the following statement: “In principle, China and Pakistan are all-weather
strategic cooperative partners and ironclad friends. Under the guidance of the
leaders of the two countries, China and Pakistan have in recent years had close
high-level exchanges, steadily advanced practical cooperation, conducted
fruitful and high-quality cooperation on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor,
and maintained sound communication and coordination in international and
regional affairs. Gwadar Port is a business cooperation project between China
and Pakistan based on equality and mutual benefit. Meanwhile, as an important
part of the CPEC, Gwadar Port follows the principles of consultation and
collaboration for shared benefits, openness and transparency.”
“We hope that with concerted efforts,” the Chinese Embassy’s statement
continues, “Gwadar Port will achieve further progress, become a regional
trading hub and industrial cooperation base and play a greater role in
promoting regional development and prosperity.”
The Pakistani Embassy did not respond to a request for comment.
Playing Both Sides
Beijing’s ambitions for Gwadar have long concerned Washington. Gwadar lies
at the mouth of the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz on the shore of the
Arabian Sea. A military base there would transform China’s ability to project
force beyond its own region and free it from dependence on maritime energy
shipping routes in Southeast Asia, while undermining Washington’s strategy of
containment against Beijing.
A 2020 report by the U.S. Naval War College highlighted the risk of China
turning Gwadar into a “strategic strongpoint” that would grant it access to the
Persian Gulf region in a future war. The report noted that Chinese investment in
Gwadar to date “does not depend primarily on commercial returns,” and was
strategic in nature. The conclusions mirror U.S. intelligence assessments
finding that China has sought to create a network of military and naval bases
around the world.
The Naval War College report also contained an important caveat: The ability to
develop Gwadar into a full-blown strategic hub hinged largely on future
decisions by Pakistan’s leaders to increase their political commitment to China
and allow it to be militarized. “If China-India and China-US relations continue to
deteriorate rapidly, China may well determine that a confrontational posture is
inevitable,” the report said. “In this case, overt militarization of China’s presence
at Gwadar—perhaps in response to a terrorist incident or a threat in the Strait of
Hormuz—might look appealing, even if it provoked harsh counter-measures.”
In 2022, the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee published a report on
Chinese influence in South Asia. It noted that Chinese ships had already begun
utilizing the port in Gwadar and highlighted the implications for the U.S. of a
full-blown future Chinese military presence there. A military base at Gwadar
would allow China “to maintain a permanent presence in the Arabian Sea and
the Gulf of Oman, expanding the naval footprint of its attack submarine and
refueling capabilities,” the report said.
The U.S. Institute of Peace report from 2023 also noted that the political
barriers to establishing a base there for China were “surmountable and
diminishing over time.” It also noted the massive strategic benefits to the
Chinese navy of having a presence at Gwadar in the event of a major war,
including the ability to launch retaliatory blockades against U.S. shipping and
energy interests in the Middle East.
“The PRC and Pakistan have a longstanding relationship. We do not ask
Pakistan—or any country--to choose between the United States and the PRC,”
the U.S. State Department said in a statement provided after publication, noting
that it couldn’t comment on “purported classified documents or comments by
unnamed sources.”
The information reviewed by Drop Site does not indicate whether concrete
steps have yet been taken to move forward with the militarization of Gwadar, a
move that would likely poison Pakistan’s future ties with the U.S., while
antagonizing many inside Pakistan who would object to a perceived sacrifice of
the country’s sovereignty.
Pakistani officials have also sought to reassure the U.S. over the port, including
by permitting ongoing visits of U.S. diplomats to Gwadar. In September 2023,
U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Donald Blome visited Gwadar along with a military
attaché, in part to “learn about port operations and development plans.”
“Due to strategic reasons, the Pakistani relationship with China will always be
close,” said Weinstein from the Quincy Institute, adding that a major concession
to China on Gwadar, “would cause an uproar in Congress and put immense
pressure on Pakistan’s relationship with the U.S.”
An Unending Economic Crisis
Worsening relations with China may have been a price the Pakistani military
was willing to pay for the benefit of closer ties with the U.S., but those closer
ties do not appear to have provided much in the way of benefit. One of the
expected upsides for the government of its turn back toward the West was
securing an IMF bailout loan worth $7 billion. As of early September 2024, the
Pakistani government has been unable to secure the IMF’s requirements for
extending the loan.
This August, Pakistani government sources vented frustration to the media over
their failed reconciliation with the U.S., lamenting the meager benefits that
mending ties had brought. Government sources told the Express Tribune that
“Pakistan’s reliance on the United States to secure the IMF package was not
yielding the results.” This week, the IMF announced a decision to consider
Pakistan’s loan request at an upcoming meeting slated for September 25,
raising hopes that a deal may still be secured.
Pakistan’s private concessions to China come as the U.S. State Department has
continued to publicly defend the military regime from criticism over its role in
rigging elections this February, gross human rights abuses inside the country
targeting the press and civil society, and an ongoing crackdown on supporters
of now-imprisoned former Prime Minister Khan. That crackdown now includes
credible threats to Khan’s life, as he continues to be held in government
custody despite repeated rejection by the courts of the charges against him.
“We believe good governance, long-term capacity building, and sustainable
market-based approaches that let the private sector flourish are the best paths
to sustained growth and development,” the State Department told Drop Site
News in its post-publication statement. “Our partnership with Pakistan spans
the full range of regional and bilateral issues, including increasing trade and
investment, strengthening security cooperation, promoting regional security
and stability, building climate resilience, supporting democracy and human
rights, and expanding people-to-people ties.”
The rigging of elections this February was met with general indifference in
Washington, as has the ongoing suppression of press and political activism in
the country. On the economic front, Pakistan’s imploding economy has
consumed Western aid with nothing to show for it but soaring inflation,
blackouts, an internet slowed to a crawl, and joblessness.
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This story was updated to include a U.S. State Department statement provided
after publication.
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