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Date: May 25, 2024 at 19:38:41
From: akira, [DNS_Address]
Subject: US Knew Saudi Arabia Was Killing African Migrants |
URL: https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3786616/us-conducts-large-scale-logistics-exercise-with-saudi-emirati-partners/ |
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U.S. Conducts Large-Scale Logistics Exercise With Saudi, Emirati Partners By Joseph Clark, DOD News |
U.S. and foreign service members pose for a photograph.
U.S. and partner forces from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are set to conclude this year's large-scale exercise showcasing the three countries' combined logistics capabilities.
The U.S. Marine Corps-led Native Fury 24 — an exercise that's in its ninth iteration this year — put combined, joint interoperability to the test through a series of complex logistics maneuvers, dynamic combat training evolutions, and convoys spanning more than 1,000 miles across two countries.
More than 600 Marines, soldiers, sailors and airmen and took part in Native Fury 24 alongside their partner nation counterparts.
This year marked the first time the exercise has featured bilateral operations with both the Royal Saudi Armed Forces and United Arab Emirates Armed Forces.
The exercise began earlier this month when equipment was offloaded at Saudi Arabia's Yanbu Port on the Red Sea. The equipment was then transported to a logistics staging area where it was prepared for the long- range convoy along the Trans-Arabian Network, a collection of seaports, airports and road networks connecting countries throughout the Arabian Peninsula.
A U.S. service member shakes hands with a member of a foreign military. Along the way, the U.S. conducted bi-lateral, live-fire and airport-repair training alongside the Royal Saudi Armed Forces at the Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia, before conducting a border crossing into the UAE.
Once in the UAE, the U.S. and UAE forces conducted convoy training, as well as refueling operations on Emirati helicopters.
Throughout the journey, U.S. Army forces leapfrogged the Marine Corps-led convoy to set up facilities for overnight stops.
The convoy ended at the UAE Port of Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman where the equipment was loaded onto a vessel for transport back the U.S.
Marine Corps Col. Matthew Hakola, director of logistics for Marine Corps Forces Central Command and the exercise control group director for Native Fury 24, said the exercise serves as key demonstration of the United States' ability to carry out complex, combined, joint exercises with partner nations.
"I think we are the best in the world at this type of thing — being able to cross the Atlantic with equipment and unload it in a relatively rapid manner and, more importantly, being able to support it once it's on the ground," Hakola said.
Those complex logistics, he said, are vital to the United States' ability to operate anywhere around the globe.
Throughout the exercise, the U.S. built upon important partnerships with the Saudi and Emirati forces, said Hakola, who served as the exercise control group director for the previous iteration of Native Fury.
He said this year it was evident that the three countries had made long strides in working together.
"I definitely saw marked improvement from the last Native Fury to this Native Fury on them thinking through the same problem sets that we think through," Hakola said. "The coordination [and] the inter-ministry coordination they provided was almost seamless."
A Marine in battle equipment stands next to a military vehicle at twilight. Exercising that coordination is key to operating together effectively in the event of a real-world scenario.
The exercise also provides an opportunity for U.S. service members to build the bonds with their foreign counterparts that are important to operating effectively together.
"That's probably the most professionally rewarding part of it," he said. "We're all humans, and it's just rewarding in that sense, and they've been great hosts," Hakola said.
"It's been a very successful exercise."
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Date: May 25, 2024 at 19:40:37
From: akira, [DNS_Address]
Subject: NY Times: US Knew Saudi Arabia Was Killing African Migrants |
URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/26/world/middleeast/saudi-killing-migrants-yemen.html |
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U.S. Knew Saudis Were Killing African Migrants The United States was told last year that Saudi security forces were shooting, shelling and abusing groups of migrants, but it chose not to raise the issue publicly.
 Ethiopian migrants on the outskirts of the Yemeni capital of Sana heading for the Saudi Arabian border, where some have faced violence at the hands of Saudi border guards. Credit... Mohammed Hamoud/Getty Images
By Ben Hubbard and Edward Wong Ben Hubbard reported from Istanbul and Edward Wong from Washington. Published Aug. 26, 2023 Updated Aug. 27, 2023
\Last fall, American diplomats received grim news that border guards in Saudi Arabia, a close U.S. partner in the Middle East, were using lethal force against African migrants who were trying to enter the kingdom from Yemen. The diplomats got more detail in December, when United Nations officials presented them with information about Saudi security forces shooting, shelling and abusing migrants, leaving many dead and wounded, according to U.S. officials and a person who attended the meetings, all of whom spoke on condition of anonymity since they were not authorized to speak to journalists.
In the months since, American officials have not publicly criticized the Saudis’ conduct, although State Department officials said this past week, following a published report of the killings, that U.S. diplomats have raised the issue with their Saudi counterparts and asked them to investigate. It remains unclear whether those discussions have affected Saudi actions.
Ben Hubbard is the Istanbul bureau chief. He has spent more than a dozen years in the Arab world, including Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Yemen. He is the author of “MBS: The Rise to Power of Mohammed bin Salman.” More about Ben Hubbard
Edward Wong is a diplomatic correspondent who has reported for The Times for more than 24 years from New York, Baghdad, Beijing and Washington. He was on a team of Pulitzer Prize finalists for Iraq War coverage. More about Edward Wong See more on: Human Rights Watch, President Joe Biden
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Date: May 26, 2024 at 00:15:19
From: ryan, [DNS_Address]
Subject: Re: NY Times: US Knew Saudi Arabia Was Killing African Migrants |
URL: https://houseofsaud.com/bush-family-and-saudi-royal-family-the-untold-connections/ |
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Exploring the complex relationship between the Bush Family and the Saudi Royal Family: A Tale of Two Kingdoms House of Saud by Mohammed Omar September 3, 2023 September 3, 2023 Understanding the Relationship Between the Bush Family and the Saudi Royal Family
The relationship between the Bush family and the Saudi Royal Family is a subject that has long captivated political analysts, policymakers, and historians alike. With two American presidents stemming from the Bush lineage and the Saudi royal family wielding significant influence in Middle Eastern affairs, these families have been central actors on the geopolitical stage. The enduring ties between them reflect broader currents in U.S.-Saudi relations and have far-reaching implications for both nations. This article delves into the nuances of this unique alliance to unearth its origins, complexities, and enduring relevance. Historical Overview
While U.S.-Saudi relations officially date back to the Kingdom’s foundation in 1932, the Bush family’s entanglement with Saudi interests begins more recently, in the oil-drenched geopolitics of the late 20th century. George H.W. Bush, first as CIA director and later as Vice President and President, laid the groundwork for the family’s ties with Saudi Arabia. This relationship would only deepen with successive generations, enduring through seismic shifts in the global landscape. Oil and Business Interests
The linchpin of this transcontinental relationship, undoubtedly, is oil. During the energy crises of the 1970s and ’80s, securing a stable oil supply became a paramount U.S. interest. It was in this environment that American firms, including those tied to the Bush family, secured lucrative contracts that would ensure the steady flow of Saudi oil to the West. The benefits were mutual: the Saudis acquired technology and expertise to modernize their oil infrastructure, solidifying their position as an energy superpower. Meanwhile, the Bush family not only accrued significant economic benefits but also established a network of political alliances that would aid their domestic political aspirations. Political Alliances
The benefits of this relationship extend into the political sphere as well. Saudi Arabia has often stood as a vital ally to the Bush administrations in global conflicts, most notably the Gulf War. Conversely, the Bush family has maintained a stance that’s generally favorable to Saudi interests, whether it be in matters of defense or international commerce. Post-9/11 Dynamics
The 9/11 attacks could have been a breaking point for the Bush-Saudi relationship, but instead, it proved its resilience. While criticism mounted over the Saudi nationals involved in the attack, both the Bush administration and Saudi leaders took steps to reinforce their partnership, working together on intelligence sharing and counter-terrorism efforts. Public Perception
In the United States, the relationship has faced scrutiny, often wrapped in conspiracy theories or accusations of undue influence. However, in Saudi Arabia, the alliance with such a powerful American family is largely seen as a boon, reinforcing the Kingdom’s position as a key player on the global stage. While questions persist, the substantive benefits to both nations are undeniable.
The ties that bind the Bush family and the Saudi Royal Family are more than mere diplomatic niceties; they’re instrumental frameworks that have impacted international politics, economies, and strategic alliances for decades. Yes, these relationships have their share of critics, who argue that such close ties come at the cost of overlooking human rights issues or other contentious points. Yet, what can’t be ignored is the fundamental truth that both families—and by extension, both nations—have mutually benefited from this alliance in ways that far outweigh the criticisms.
The oil interests are seen by most outsiders as bing clear-cut. The Saudi Kingdom’s vast oil reserves have been a lifeblood for the U.S., have provided stability to the US Dollar, and by intertwining these resources with the Bush family’s businesses, a two-way street of technological and financial gains was established. America’s need for oil and Saudi Arabia’s need for modernization have created a symbiotic relationship that goes beyond mere transactional interactions, this is mirrored in the relationship between the Bush and Al Saud families. And let’s not overlook the role this alliance has played in geopolitics. When you’re facing conflicts like the Gulf War or the complexities of Middle Eastern diplomacy, having a reliable ally is not just advantageous—it’s essential.
In a world marred by transient loyalties and wavering alliances, the Bush-Saudi relationship has withstood the test of time. It weathered the storm of 9/11, a point where many alliances would have crumbled under the weight of public scrutiny. Instead, both families made calculated moves to fortify their partnership, recognizing that a united front was more valuable than yielding to public pressure. The resilience of this relationship speaks volumes, demonstrating a shared commitment to long-term objectives, even in the face of short-term adversities.
The nature of international relations is inherently complex, characterized by ever-changing dynamics and shifting allegiances. But when you sift through the layers of the Bush-Saudi relationship, what you find is a remarkable constancy. Whether you view it through the lens of realpolitik or mutual interests, there’s no denying that this alliance has been instrumental for both parties.
It’s easy to get caught up in sensationalism around the Bush-Saud family relationship, but what cannot be disputed is its efficacy. The two families collaborative pursuits have yielded mutual benefit, setting a precedent for how international relationships between powerful families can be cultivated and maintained. The Bush family and the Saudi Royal Family have essentially written a playbook on building and sustaining a successful international alliance across generations. With uncertain times ahead, this isn’t just a relationship to be observed but a model to be studied and replicated. Because if history has shown us anything, it’s that this alliance isn’t going anywhere—and for good reason.
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Date: May 25, 2024 at 19:42:43
From: akira, [DNS_Address]
Subject: The US knew about the Saudi's involvement in 9/11 too |
URL: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/saudi-arabia-911/ |
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New evidence of Saudi gov't role in 9/11 should halt security pact talk
Yet the Biden administration is for some unknown reason moving full steam ahead
DANIEL LARISON MAY 24, 2024 There is new evidence that shows that some Saudi government officials were more involved in the 9/11 attacks than previously known. According to a new filing in a lawsuit brought by the families of the 9/11 victims, al-Qaida operatives received significant support from members of the Saudi government in their preparations for the attacks.
As Daniel Benjamin, president of the American Academy in Berlin, and Quincy Institute senior fellow Steven Simon explain in a new article for The Atlantic, the plaintiffs allege that Saudi officials “were not rogue operators but rather the front end of a conspiracy that included the Saudi embassy in Washington and senior government officials in Riyadh.” If the allegations are true, that has important implications for our understanding of the attacks and how international terrorist groups operate, and it also gives Americans another reason to question the wisdom of a security pact with Saudi Arabia today.
There had already been some proof of collusion between Saudi officials and 9/11 hijackers revealed in the past, but as Benjamin and Simon point out, the new evidence suggests that the actions taken by two Saudi officials working in the U.S. to support the hijackers were “deliberate, sustained, and carefully coordinated with other Saudi officials.” If true, the failure of our government to hold the Saudis accountable for the role of their officials in the attacks is inexcusable. It makes the continued indulgence of Saudi Arabia by successive administrations over the last two decades even more repugnant.
The Saudi government predictably denies the allegations, but that is what Riyadh always does when there are credible accusations of wrongdoing against it. In the weeks following the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018, the Saudi government claimed that it had done nothing to him and even used a poorly disguised double to promote a false story that he had voluntarily left the consulate in Istanbul. The Saudi government routinely denied responsibility for airstrikes on civilian targets in Yemen when their forces were the only ones that could have launched them. Saudi denials don’t count for much, and I wouldn’t bet on their veracity in this case, either.
Benjamin and Simon make a strong case that evidence of deeper Saudi involvement in the 9/11 attacks discredits Washington’s militarized “war on terror” response. Imagining that al-Qaida had pulled off such spectacular attacks without state support and a support network inside the U.S. encouraged policymakers to indulge in threat hyperinflation that turned terrorism from a real but manageable problem into the defining menace of the age. Had the U.S. better understood how the attacks happened, Benjamin and Simon suggest that “we might well have had the confidence to leave Afghanistan quickly, instead of lingering for 20 years.” The U.S. would have also had no reason to embroil itself in conflicts in Africa in the name of counterterrorism.
While it is true that the “Saudi Arabia of 2001 no longer exists,” as Benjamin and Simon say, evidence of significant official Saudi complicity in the worst terrorist attacks in American history must be taken into account when considering what the future of the U.S.-Saudi relationship should be. If elements of some other government were implicated in a major attack on the United States, it is doubtful that our political leaders would now be entertaining the idea of giving them a security guarantee and nuclear technology, as is being suggested as part of a new U.S. arrangement with Saudi Arabia. There are already many reasons why the Biden administration’s proposed security pact and nuclear deal with Riyadh are undesirable for the United States, but evidence of deeper Saudi involvement in 9/11 ought to make the idea so politically radioactive that no one will want to have anything to do with it.
Despite the war in Gaza, the Biden administration is still determined to pursue a normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia and Israel. There has been a flurry of recent reports that negotiations for the U.S.-Saudi portion of the “mega-deal” are nearing completion. The Saudis have been happy to agree to an arrangement where the U.S. gives them lots of expensive gifts and they are expected to do almost nothing in return. As it has been from the start, Israeli unwillingness to make real concessions to the Palestinians on anything is the main obstacle to concluding the larger deal. The U.S. should want no part of an agreement where it assumes additional burdens but gains nothing.
The president’s fixation on this deal has baffled many regional and foreign policy experts, who can’t fathom why the U.S. is spending so much time and energy on an initiative that isn’t going to solve any of the region’s problems. One explanation is that the administration believes that this will lock the Saudis into closer alignment with the U.S. as part of rivalry with China, but that doesn’t make much sense. The Saudis will continue increasing their business ties with China no matter what the U.S. gives them. Another is that the president’s view of a Saudi-Israeli agreement is as outdated as his approach to the region as a whole and he thinks it will be on par with the Camp David Accords. Perhaps the simplest explanation is that Biden wishes to outdo Trump in doing favors for Israel.
Whatever the reason for it, the U.S. stands to pay an unacceptably high price for any agreement. Our government shouldn’t be looking to tie itself more closely to the Saudis in any case. The latest revelations of possibly greater Saudi complicity in 9/11 should be the final straw that puts an end to any more talk of a security pact with Riyadh.
Daniel Larison Daniel Larison is a regular columnist at Responsible Statecraft, contributing editor at Antiwar.com, and a former senior editor at The American Conservative magazine. He has a Ph.D. in History from the University of Chicago. He writes regularly for his newsletter, Eunomia, on Substack. The views expressed by authors on Responsible Statecraft do not necessarily reflect those of the Quincy Institute or its associates.
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Date: May 25, 2024 at 19:44:03
From: akira, [DNS_Address]
Subject: Atlantic: New 9/11 Evidence Points to Deep Saudi Complicity |
URL: https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2024/05/september-11-attacks-saudi-arabia-lawsuit/678430/ |
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New 9/11 Evidence Points to Deep Saudi Complicity Two decades of U.S. policy appear to be rooted in a mistaken understanding of what happened that day.
By Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon ty MAY 20, 2024
For more than two decades, through two wars and domestic upheaval, the idea that al-Qaeda acted alone on 9/11 has been the basis of U.S. policy. A blue-ribbon commission concluded that Osama bin Laden had pioneered a new kind of terrorist group—combining superior technological know-how, extensive resources, and a worldwide network so well coordinated that it could carry out operations of unprecedented magnitude. This vanguard of jihad, it seemed, was the first nonstate actor that rivaled nation-states in the damage it could wreak.
That assessment now appears wrong. And if our understanding of what transpired on 9/11 turns out to have been flawed, then the costly policies that the United States has pursued for the past quarter century have been rooted in a false premise.
The global War on Terror was based on a mistake.
Anew filing in a lawsuit brought by the families of 9/11 victims against the government of Saudi Arabia alleges that al-Qaeda had significant, indeed decisive, state support for its attacks. Officials of the Saudi government, the plaintiffs’ attorneys contend, formed and operated a network inside the United States that provided crucial assistance to the first cohort of 9/11 hijackers to enter the country.
The 71-page document, released in redacted form earlier this month, summarizes what the plaintiffs say they’ve learned through the evidence obtained in discovery and recently declassified materials. They allege that Saudi officials—most notably Fahad al-Thumairy, an imam at a Los Angeles mosque and an accredited diplomat at Saudi Arabia’s consulate in that city, and Omar al-Bayoumi, who masqueraded as a graduate student but was identified by the FBI as an intelligence operative—were not rogue operators but rather the front end of a conspiracy that included the Saudi embassy in Washington and senior government officials in Riyadh.
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