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53697 |
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Date: April 10, 2024 at 11:16:56
From: chatillon, [DNS_Address]
Subject: The Dahiya Doctrine |
URL: link |
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What Is the Dahiya Doctrine?
In the 2006 Lebanon War, Israel Defense Force Northern
Commander Gadi Eisenkot, now the deputy chief of general
staff, recommended and had approved the application of a
military strategy that would target and destroy an
entire civilian area rather than fight to overtake
fortified positions one by one. This was in an effort to
minimize IDF casualties while at the same time holding
the entire civilian populace accountable for the actions
of a few. A move some called revolutionary in modern
warfare, the doctrine did away with the effort to
distinguish between militant and civilian, using an
overwhelming display of force through airstrikes to
destroy the entire Lebanese Dahiya quarter.
The strategy itself calls for the deliberate targeting
of civilians and civilian infrastructure in order to
induce suffering and severe distress throughout the
targeted population. By targeting indiscriminately, the
IDF hopes to deter further military attacks against
Israel, destroy its enemies, as well as influence the
population to oust the militants seen as the primary
target. The IDF has planned on using the strategy since
2008, and is seen as doing so in the current conflict in
Gaza based on the increasing number of civilian
casualties. The result so far has been the death of more
than 1,200 Palestinians, including 241 children and 130
women. Of the estimated death count, more than 70
percent have been identified as innocent civilians. The
Dahiya Doctrine amounts to the direct use of state
terrorism and is now the functioning military policy of
the IDF.
The destruction of locations such as UN Relief and Works
Agency shelters, mosques and residences of unaffiliated
individuals is at minimum an agreed upon collateral
objective in addition to the Hamas tunnel system and the
militants themselves.
The IDF argues that it has no other choice because Hamas
uses locations such as these to shield military
activities, making detection more difficult. After the
2008 Gaza War, the UN deployed a fact-finding mission to
conduct an investigation into allegations made by both
sides. The UN issued the “Goldstone Report,” which said
among other things that, “On the basis of the
investigations it has conducted, the Mission did not
find any evidence to support the allegations that
hospital facilities were used by the Gaza authorities or
by Palestinian armed groups to shield military
activities and that ambulances were used to transport
combatants or for other military purposes.” One alleged
war crime (hiding among the civilian population) does
not give rise for the justification of another: the
killing of women, children and civilians. Even now,
artillery shells struck a second UN shelter resulting in
civilian casualties and attacks against a power plant
may have killed 15 workers trapped inside and may
effectively eliminate electricity for the majority of
the population.
A Policy of War Crime
State terrorism, “establishment terrorism” or “terrorism
from above” is generally understood to mean the
systematic and intentional use of violence against
either military or civilian targets meant to create a
climate of fear in a population in order to bring about
a specific political objective. The idea itself can be
traced back as far as recorded warfare, but no consensus
currently exists because states view themselves as
legitimate actors, and therefore incapable of being
terrorists. Bruce Hoffman argues that there is a
“fundamental qualitative difference between the two
types of violence” (state and non-state actors), and
that the norms and rules of war followed by states
preclude various tactics from being implemented, and as
such prohibits the notion of state-sponsored terrorism.
While there is a qualitative difference between Israeli
and Palestinian violence, namely the overwhelming
suffering the Dahiya Doctrine is meant to create, there
is also a severe quantitative difference in that IDF war
making machines are far superior to what is being used
by Hamas. More importantly, when state actors cease
adherence to international norms of war, and openly
state that the target is no longer the militants, but
the civilian populace, their actions have clearly become
war crimes.
Additional Protocol 1, Article 51 (3) of the Geneva
Conventions is designed to provide civilians immunity
from attack “unless and for such time as they take a
direct part in hostilities.” Articles 76 (women) and 77
(children), 15 (civilian medical personnel and
religious) and 79 (journalist) provide special
protections for each category respectively. Israel is
not a signatory to Protocol 1, but surprisingly enough
Palestine is after the Palestinian Authority signed the
accord on February 4, 2014, even while the United States
and Israel opposed the action. In 2009, Palestine gained
recognition as a nonmember observer state, and according
to Luis Moreno Ocampo, a former International Criminal
Court (ICC) prosecutor, may qualify as a state and gain
full status as an ICC member. This would enable
Palestine to bring war crimes charges against Israel,
under a provision that allows for the charges of crimes
committed before gaining state recognition as long as
the alleged crimes occurred after the formation of the
ICC in 2002.
In fact, the United States and Israel both oppose
Palestine’s full membership in the UN specifically
because it would allow the Palestinians to potentially
join the International Criminal Court, and bring war
crime charges. In April 2014, Samantha Power, US
Ambassador to the UN, was clear when she said that the
United States is in “firm opposition to any and all
unilateral [Palestinian] actions in the international
arena” because they “really pose a profound threat to
Israel” and would be “devastating to the peace process.”
Some see the recognition of Palestine as a nonmember
state as acting as a terrorist co-conspirator with the
Palestinian Authority and called successfully for the
defunding of 22 percent of the budget paid by the United
States. Public Law 101-246, enacted in 1990, states, “No
funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or any
other Act shall be available for the United Nations or
any specialized agency thereof which accords the
Palestine Liberation Organization the same standing as
member states.”
After the 2008 war, the Goldstone Report addressed IDF
strategy in 2009, determining that the “Disproportionate
destruction and violence against civilians were part of
a deliberate policy.” In fact, Additional Protocol 1,
Article 51(4)(c) specifically prohibits striking
“military objectives and civilians or civilian objects
without distinction,” but this is exactly what is
happening in Gaza.
The Dahiya Doctrine is designed to develop deterrence,
which is a political objective. Indiscriminate violence
used to gain political objectives is no different than
non-state actor terrorism, and should be categorized and
treated as such. This policy of war crimes is flawed
because if you target the civilian population and its
infrastructure, you inevitably create a climate where
the idea of self-defense is no longer considered
radical, but a necessity. In essence, you are hastening
the radicalization of an entire generation and
population, and their international allies. The doctrine
is doomed to fail unless a state follows through with
the complete destruction of the targeted people. This is
synonymous with genocide.
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Responses:
[53707] [53700] |
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53707 |
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Date: April 10, 2024 at 12:00:59
From: chaskuchar@stcharlesmo, [DNS_Address]
Subject: Re: The Dahiya Doctrine |
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God knows and justice will prevail. i hope those
responsible will repent and not lose their soul. each
soul saved doubles the size of heaven. think about it.
relationships!
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Responses:
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53700 |
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Date: April 10, 2024 at 11:23:14
From: akira, [DNS_Address]
Subject: Israel’s use of disproportionate force is a long-established tactic... |
URL: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/dec/05/israel-disproportionate-force-tactic-infrastructure-economy-civilian-casualties |
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Israel’s use of disproportionate force is a long-established tactic – with a
clear aim
Paul Rogers
The strategy goes well beyond defeating an opponent: it seeks to destroy
key infrastructure and the economy, with many civilian casualties
Paul Rogers is emeritus professor of peace studies at Bradford University
Tue 5 Dec 2023
How to make sense of the sheer intensity of Israel’s war in Gaza? One
understanding is that it is the result of the enduring shock of the 7 October
massacre combined with a far-right government that includes extreme
elements. Yet this ignores another element: a specific Israeli approach to war
known as the Dahiya doctrine. It’s also one reason why the “pause” was
never going to last for very long.
First, let us take stock of the state of Gaza. After a seven-day pause in the
airstrikes, the war resumed on Friday. In the last three days, bombing has
been heavy, and the total death toll since 7 October has risen to 15,899,
according to the Gaza health ministry, with at least 41,000 wounded. Among
the dead are 6,500 children, including hundreds of infants.
Physical destruction in Gaza has been massive: 60% of the territory’s total
housing stock (234,000 homes) is damaged, 46,000 of which are completely
destroyed. The seven-day pause may have provided limited relief from the
comprehensive siege but there are still serious shortages of food, clean
water and medical supplies.
Despite massive Israeli attacks backed by a near-unlimited supply of bombs
and missiles and intelligence support from the United States, Hamas
continues to fire rockets. Moreover, it retains a substantial paramilitary ability
with 18 of the original 24 active paramilitary battalions intact, including all 10
in southern Gaza.
Palestinian support for Hamas may also be growing in the West Bank, where
armed settlers and the Israel Defense Forces have killed scores of
Palestinians since the war started. The Israeli government is absolutely
determined to continue and is accelerating the war, despite US secretary of
state Antony Blinken’s blunt warning to limit casualties and vice-president
Kamala Harris confirming that “under no circumstances will the United States
permit the forced relocation of Palestinians from Gaza or the West Bank, the
besiegement of Gaza, or the redrawing of the borders of Gaza”.
That will count for little, given the extreme position of Benjamin Netanyahu’s
war cabinet, where the aim is to destroy Hamas. How this will be attempted
relates to the specific Israeli way of war that has evolved since 1948, through
to its current Dahiya doctrine, which is said to have originated in the 2006
war in Lebanon.
In July of that year, facing salvoes of rockets fired from southern Lebanon by
Hezbollah militias, the IDF fought an intense air and ground war. Neither
succeeded, and the ground troops took heavy casualties; but the
significance of the war lies in the nature of the air attacks. It was directed at
centres of Hezbollah power in the Dahiya area, in the southern suburbs of
Beirut, but also on the Lebanese economic infrastructure.
This was the deliberate application of “disproportionate force”, such as the
destruction of an entire village, if deemed to be the source of rocket fire. One
graphic description of the result was that “around a thousand Lebanese
civilians were killed, a third of them children. Towns and villages were
reduced to rubble; bridges, sewage treatment plants, port facilities and
electric power plants were crippled or destroyed.”
Two years after that war, the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv
University published Disproportionate Force: Israel’s Concept of Response in
Light of the Second Lebanon War. Written by IDF reserve Col Gabi Siboni, it
promoted the Dahiya doctrine as the way forward in response to paramilitary
attacks. The head of the Israeli military forces in Lebanon during the war, and
overseeing the doctrine, was General Gadi Eizenkot. He went on to be the
IDF chief of general staff, retiring in 2019, but was brought back as an adviser
to Netanyahu’s war cabinet in October.
Siboni’s paper for the institute made it crystal clear that the Dahiya doctrine
goes well beyond defeating an opponent in a brief conflict, and is about
having a truly long-lasting impact. Disproportionate force means just that,
extending to the destruction of the economy and state infrastructure with
many civilian casualties, with the intention of achieving a sustained deterrent
impact.
The doctrine has been used in Gaza during the four previous wars since
2008, especially the 2014 war. In those four wars, the IDF killed about 5,000
Palestinians, mostly civilians, for the loss of 350 of their own soldiers and
about 30 civilians. In the 2014 war, Gaza’s main power station was damaged
in an IDF attack and half of Gaza’s then population of 1.8 million people were
affected by water shortages, hundreds of thousands lacked power and raw
sewage flooded on to streets.
Even earlier, after the 2008-9 war in Gaza, the UN published a fact-finding
report that concluded that the Israeli strategy had been “designed to punish,
humiliate and terrorise a civilian population”.
The situation now, after two months of war, is far worse. With the ground
offensive in southern Gaza under way, it will not stop, exacerbated by tens of
thousands of desperate Gazans repeatedly trying to find places of safety.
The immediate Israeli aim, which may take months to achieve, appears to be
eliminating Hamas while corralling the Palestinians into a small zone in the
south-west of Gaza where they can be more easily controlled. The longer-
term aim is to make it utterly clear that Israel will not stand for any opposition.
Its armed forces will maintain sufficient power to control any insurgency and,
backed by its powerful nuclear capabilities, will not allow any regional state to
pose a threat.
It will fail. Hamas will emerge either in a different form or strengthened,
unless some way is found to begin the very difficult task of bringing the
communities together. Meanwhile, the one state that can force a ceasefire is
the US, but there is little sign of that – at least so far.
Paul Rogers is emeritus professor of peace studies at Bradford University
and an honorary fellow at the Joint Service Command and Staff College
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